The Curse of 1967 - Part 1 - A Misguided Settlement Policy

In order to come to any meaningful conclusion about what policies should be implemented in the territories, it is important first to understand the mistakes of the past, and the negative influence the territories have had on Israel strategically, politically, and morally. Many of the detrimental effects of the territories are due specifically to the policy of Jewish settlement in the territories begun in the aftermath of the Six Day War.

The Six Day War was Israel's most stunning military victory. As Arab armies prepared attacks from all sides, Israel launched a preemptive strike, taking out Egypt's air force while it was still on the ground, and driving Syrian and Jordanian forces back into their own territory. By the time the last shots were fired, Israel had taken all of Jerusalem, the West Bank, the Golan, Sinai, and Gaza, essentially doubling the country's territory and providing it with strategic depth to guard against future attacks. But the new territory in the West Bank and Gaza would become a cancer which would plague the nation for the next 40 years.

The Six Day War put Israel into a state of euphoria. The world stood in awe as "tiny Israel" took on the Arab states and put an end to the threat in days. The image of the Israeli paratroopers at the Western Wall has become iconic. And the stunning military victory seemed to have religious significance as well, as Jews finally had control of the Temple Mount and the land of the biblical kingdom of David. Even those staunchly secular Zionists seemed to be influenced by the religious euphoria. When Jerusalem rabbis rushed to the Western Wall to pray there after it was taken, Moshe Dayan remarked, at first, "what is this, the Vatican?"; a few days later he was preaching to his troops about the fulfillment of biblical prophecy.

The war also provided Israel with a major bargaining chip. Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza fundamentally changed Arab demands and the framework of negotiations. While Arabs had previously sought to reclaim all of the land between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River, they eventually began to demand a return to the 1967 borders, thereby essentially admitting Israeli control of the rest of what had been Mandatory Palestine. This fundamental change in the status quo was the war's most important gain--not the return of ancient lands to Jewish control.

Even at the time, there were voices warning against occupation and calling for Israel to use the lands as a bargaining chip for a peace deal. David Ben-Gurion, Israel's founder and first prime minister, was characteristically pragmatic toward the newly acquired territory. During a helicopter tour over the West Bank he said, "Now we must give all this land back at once. Except Jerusalem, perhaps. That we will have to discuss." Ben-Gurion, however, was part of an older generation of staunchly secular, socialist, and above all, pragmatic Zionists. The Israel of 1967, on the other hand, was a powerful, confident, and seemingly invincible nation; any talk of giving up the land fell on deaf ears. And thus, the possible opportunity of returning the West Bank to Jordan while it still wanted the land, and effectively preventing the rise of Palestinian nationalism, was lost.

In the aftermath of the war, the movement to settle ancient biblical lands began to gain strength. To those who believed in Religious Zionism, the Six Day War provided the opportunity to settle the land and hasten the coming of the messiah. Leaving aside the opposition of the international community to Israeli settlement in the territories, many settlements were founded without even the support of the Israeli government. Perhaps the most well-known of these cases is the Jewish presence in Hebron, which was led by Rabbi Moshe Levinger. Levinger rented rooms in Hebron in order to conduct passover services in 1968, after which he and his followers simply refused to leave. In a "deal" with the Israeli government Levinger established the settlement of Kiryat Arba on the outskirts of Hebron. (It is ironic that Levinger used passover services as an excuse to enter Hebron and never leave; the ancient Israelites also told Pharaoh that they were leaving to pray, and never returned.)

It is dangerous to allow political decisions to be religiously-motivated, or to be swayed by religiously-motivated people. Of course, the settlements were also seen as a strategic defense against attacks by Arabs in the territories. Yet, the lack of will on the part of the Israeli government to remove settlement outposts that even it did not endorse, points to the presence of something other than strategic concerns in the decision-making process of Israeli politicians--whether it be a reluctance to cause civil strife or an underlying religious and cultural support for a Jewish presence on ancient Jewish land.

Thus, the most significant problem in the settlement policy was a supreme lack of planning and foresight, and what seems like a policy of simply avoiding confrontation and putting off major issues. It is almost as if Israeli leaders had no coherent policy at all, and believed that eventually the Arab population would simply disappear. While it is almost understandable that religious individuals who believe in messianic solutions would ignore political realities, it is utterly unacceptable for political leaders to simply "put off" facing the facts.

As the years passed, the reality of the settlement policy and the bloody conflict that has resulted have become apparent. Violence perpetrated by both Palestinians and settlers is equally abhorrent and unjustifiable, and it does no good to try to excuse either. It is equally useless to engage in arguments over who threw the first stone or fired the first shot. The reality is a seemingly endless cycle of violence; and the reality is that Israel controls the West Bank and who who can reside there.

Israeli control of the territories could have had a much smaller effect on the lives of the average Arab inhabitants, were it not for the settlement policy. Of course, some changes would have been made regardless of settlement policy, such as border security and the presence of some Israeli military installations within the territories. While the average Palestinian may have had an abstract opposition to Israeli rule, his life, and the lives of those around him could have been left relatively unchanged, and even improved by access to Israeli markets and goods. In fact, this is precisely what happened before the intifadas and the resulting polarization between Israelis and Palestinians.

It is not difficult to imagine how Israeli settlement (and its accompanying security apparatus) have had a profound, and sometimes radicalizing, effect on the average Arab inhabitant of the territories. The settlements provided visible evidence of Israeli control as well as a tangible reason to be angry, and even hate, Israelis. The effect on Palestinians of having what was once their land settled by people they saw as outsiders should not be underestimated. Even if one's personal land was not affected, there is a strong psychological effect of literally seeing what one believes is his country settled by others.

In a very real sense as well, the settlements have had a detrimental effect on the lives of Palestinians in the West Bank. While it is not true of most Israeli settlers, many who choose to live in the territories are religious extremists. There have been recent cases of settlers from the Yitzhar settlement attacking Palestinians, their crops, and even shooting rockets at Arab villages. Clashes between settlers in Hebron and the Arab population there are frequent. It is not difficult to understand how anger could be aroused among Arabs faced with these sorts of attacks. In these cases Israel's "face" to the Palestinians is that of an extremist who is willing to do them harm. This only adds fuel to Arab extremism and even, in their view, justifies it.

The escalating violence and clashes between settlers and Palestinians has necessitated the building of a complex security apparatus for the protection of settlers. Of course, not all military checkpoints and roadblocks are meant solely for the protection of settlers; many are meant to protect Israel proper from terror attacks and to prevent arms from being transported between terror cells. But a large number of checkpoints and roadblocks were specifically put in place to protect Israeli settlements. The checkpoints and roadblocks present a serious obstruction to the daily flow of Arab life in the territories. In perhaps the most extreme case of Hebron, Arab houses are surrounded by wire fence in order to protect them harrasment from settlers who live in the city. While these Arabs are essentially confined to a cage, Hebron settlers enjoy full freedom to move about the city. It is easy to see how animosity can arise among the average Arab inhabitants of the territories.

The purpose of this article is not to make any apologies for Arab violence and terror. Nor is its purpose to suggest that settlements are the only reason for deep-seated hatred toward Israel among Palestinians or that the removal of settlements would magically solve the conflict. But the mistakes of the past should be acknowledged, as well as the fact that the presence of settlements only exacerbates the existing tensions and conflicts. It must be acknowledged that the removal of unnecessary settlements would at least alleviate some of the pressures on the Arab populations in the territories, and thereby prevent the radicalization of the average Arabs in the territories. Israel must realize that the increasing radicalization of the Arab populations poses the most serious threat to its security, and that the only way to reach a meaningful accord with the Palestinians is to cultivate moderate views among the Arab population. It will not be easy, but the removal of settlements is a necessary (and of course, not sufficient) step toward achieving this goal.

The Spectrum of Terror: Making Sense of the Latest Attacks in Jerusalem

This year has witnessed a rise in attacks in Jerusalem by Arabs who live in the city itself--those with the blue Israeli identity card and the freedom to travel throughout Jerusalem and Israel. This should be a cause for concern, as attacks are originating in areas other than the territories and among Arabs who enjoy more freedom of movement than those in the territories. The very policies that Israel has implemented to secure the country from attack have led some of the Arabs with the most freedoms to carry out attacks against Israelis--not with the backing of terrorist organizations, but on their own.

In order to make sense of this year's attacks, it is important not to tar all forms of "terror" with the same brush, as it seems many Israelis are quick to do. This tendency creates the false impression that Israel is facing a monolithic jihadist threat, which results in a failure to deal appropriately with different forms of terror. A distinction must be drawn between terror organized and perpetrated by extremist Islamic organizations such as Hamas, and attacks which are planned and carried out by individuals. In other words, suicide bombings and the recent bulldozer and car attacks, are not the same--not in the sense that one is any less abhorrent, but rather in the way we must understand them.

Terror can be seen on a spectrum, according to differences in planning and preparation, organizational backing, and ideological motivation. The suicide bombing is terror in the most traditional sense. It is well-planned, has the logistical and financial backing of a terror network, and is motivated by a twisted and violent Islamic fundamentalism bent on the destruction of the State of Israel.

This year's attacks, however, have moved away from this form of terror, along the spectrum, beginning with the attack at the Merkaz Harav yeshiva in which an Arab from East Jerusalem murdered a room full of students. That attack was clearly planned in advance, as the shooter traveled armed into West Jerusalem, and targeted a specific yeshiva which preaches Jewish settlement in the West Bank. While there was an ideological element to the attack as well, it was not supported by a terrorist network (although some tried to claim responsibility). The bulldozer attacks in Jerusalem were further along the spectrum. While the attacks may have been planned in advance, there was not much preparation necessary, they were not backed by a terrorist network, and they were of a more spontaneous nature than the attack at Mercaz Harav.

Still further along the spectrum is the most recent attack in Jerusalem, in which a 19-year old Arab plowed his family car into a group of soldiers crossing the street. This attack had an even more spontaneous quality (given the fact that the attacker did not have access to any special weapon such as a bulldozer), did not have (or need) the backing of a terrorist network, and was not motivated by a specific Islamist ideology. Rather, it seems to have been fueled by general discontentment and a suicidal urge that resulted from a failed attempt at marrying a relative. In the Middle East, for the disturbed and discontented there is an obvious target--the "other". Because it is in the context of the larger conflict, that person is termed a terrorist in the same vein as a suicide bomber.

Understanding the movement of attacks along this spectrum highlights the newest and perhaps most serious danger to Israeli security. Just as it is more difficult to fight a terrorist organization than a country, it is infinitely more difficult to prevent attacks planned and carried out by individuals than it is to fight a terrorist organization. In fact, Israeli police have admitted that they have no solution to this form of attack and have no method to prevent them. This difficulty is only magnified by the fact that the perpetrators of the last four attacks have come from East Jerusalem, and had complete freedom of movement within Jerusalem and Israel.

In addition, as the attacks move further along the spectrum of terror, they are motivated less by extremist ideology, and more by general discontentment and unhappiness, which is naturally blamed on Israeli policies. In fact, the Shin Bet security service recently concluded that the separation wall around Jerusalem has isolated East Jerusalem Arabs from the rest of the Palestinian population, causing them to become more extreme. As they are pushed up against a wall (quite literally), they see few options, and are more likely to resort to violence.

And this is not limited to Arabs in Jerusalem. In recent weeks there have been a number of incidents at checkpoints in the territories, including an attack in which an elderly Palestinian woman threw acid in the eyes of an Israeli soldier.

In the face of the growing trend toward "individual" terror, the hard-lined right wing approach simply does not provide a viable solution. Much of the right-wing position is based on the (correct) argument that terrorist organizations are motivated by a twisted ideology and will stop at nothing short of Israel's destruction. However, this argument collapses when faced with attacks which result not from a fundamentalist ideology, but more out of individual discontentment.

For example, Shin-Bet has repeatedly concluded that the demolition of terrorist homes does not prevent terror, and actually incites more terror attacks--both those carried out by organizations and those carried out by individuals. More importantly, while it is possible to implement a hard-lined policy toward a terrorist organization, which would include arrests and targeted assassinations, it is quite impossible to do so when terror comes from individuals rather than an identifiable organization.

The only treatment for this problem is to attack the root of Arab discontent. While this should not mean, of course, dismantling the entire security apparatus, it means that a concerted effort must be made to change the status quo and address the root cause of the problem rather than simply treating its symptoms. It may be impossible to prevent a religious fanatic or extremist from attempting to carry out an attack. But it is definitely possible to prevent an average individual from being drawn toward twisted ideology because of discontentment, or using an attack on Israelis as a way to commit suicide. If real effort is not made immediately to alleviate the difficulties faced by the Arab population, it will result in irreparable damage and the movement of more and more discontented Arabs toward violence against Israel.